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‘Economic risk is a lot like a hurricane. Hurricanes strike 
powerfully and suddenly. They rip apart what they touch; 
property, landscape and lives … And although they can be 
prepared for, they cannot be prevented.’ These sentiments, 
from Yale political scientist Jacob Hacker, explain why 
economic risk is a concern for households, and why the 
extent of that concern depends a great deal on how well 
households are protected against risk. The potential for 
individual bad luck to lead to hardship has meant that society 
has, in many instances, determined that individual risk 
should be borne collectively through systems of social welfare 
or social insurance (Hacker, 2008, p.5). 
shaping individual incentives and levels of 
human capital, their exposure to shocks of 
various sorts and their ability to absorb or 
adapt to such shocks. The question of 
economic security for New Zealanders is 
therefore not simply one of social 
assistance, but of whether the system 
overall results in buffers of a public and 
private nature that are adequate for the 
challenges of the current environment. 
This article examines this question 
through an analysis of the volatility of 
individual incomes in New Zealand. It 
begins by explaining the concept of 
income volatility and its importance as an 
indicator of economic security. The data, 
methodology and findings of this analysis 
will then be explained, followed by a 
consideration of the limitations of this 
approach in terms of both measurement 
and the conclusions that can be drawn. 
The discussion section will address how 
this analysis relates to existing work on 
income mobility, examine other evidence 
that might contextualise the findings and 
suggest areas for future research.
Measuring volatility in incomes
Income volatility is the variance in 
personal incomes over time. The 
international literature on income 
volatility is substantial and growing, and 
mostly focused on year-to-year volatility, 
though there is a smaller body of work Toby Moore is a teaching fellow at the School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington.
Income Volatility 
in New Zealand
It is useful to remind ourselves of this 
fact, because much public discussion of 
economic security has a distinctly static 
quality to it. Inequality, poverty and 
hardship are often debated as if the 
involved parties were frozen in position, 
like figures on a complex and occasionally 
cruel carousel. This tendency towards 
treating social classes as relatively fixed 
means that social welfare can come to be 
seen as based more in charity than in 
reciprocal obligations and risk sharing. 
Though the redistributive role of 
government is important, there is a risk 
that, in Nicholas Barr’s analogy, the 
‘Robin Hood’ aspect of the welfare state is 
emphasised at the expense of its role as 
the collective ‘Piggy Bank’ (Barr, 2001).
The state’s role in contributing to the 
smooth life trajectories of its citizens is 
not limited to welfare payments. The state 
also shapes the institutional setting in 
which individuals and households 
operate. It therefore has some hand in 
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considering volatility over a shorter time 
frame. As part of the 2017 ‘state of the 
state’ report, Fit for the Future: boosting 
resilience in the face of uncertainty, Deloitte 
and Victoria University of Wellington 
constructed an index of income volatility 
for New Zealanders between 2001 and 
2014. This is the first study to construct 
a year-by-year index for New Zealand, 
though other studies have addressed the 
question indirectly (e.g., Carter, Mok and 
Le, 2014). 
Measuring income volatility can 
provide some insight into both the 
frequency and the impact of the shocks 
faced by individuals, as well as the 
effectiveness of government transfers in 
offsetting economic loss. Disruption to 
income can be of a direct nature: for 
instance, a worker being made redundant; 
or more indirect, such as a serious health 
problem that prevents someone from 
working. Taking a broad view of the 
likelihood of individual income loss does 
not tell us what the cause of that loss is. 
Nonetheless, it is useful to look at the level 
and trend of income volatility, if only 
because macroeconomic trends may not 
tell us the full story of what is happening 
at the micro level, and averages can often 
disguise changes in distribution. 
When assessing the social and 
economic context in which households 
operate, there is a tendency to resort to 
broad narrative accounts such as 
‘globalisation’, ‘the great moderation’ or 
‘the great recession’. (More recent 
examples would include ‘secular 
stagnation’, ‘the rise of the robots’ and ‘the 
new normal’.) However, it is not 
immediately clear that such terms 
accurately reflect the experiences at the 
household level (Dynan, Elmendorf and 
Sichel, 2012). ‘The great moderation’ was 
the term used to describe the reduced 
volatility of key macroeconomic 
indicators in the United States in the 
decades prior to the global financial crisis 
(Stock and Watson, 2002); yet this was 
also a period of increasing volatility of 
household incomes, according a number 
of US studies (Hacker and Jacobs, 2008; 
Gottschalk and Moffitt, 2009).  
Much has been written about why low 
incomes are a problem for the families 
that must live off them. If volatility also 
results in low or inadequate incomes, then 
the social, psychological and health- or 
education-related consequences 
associated with poverty will be of 
relevance (Boston and Chapple, 2014). 
However, downward shifts in income are 
important for additional reasons, beyond 
the possibility of falling into poverty. 
Greater variability in incomes makes it 
much harder for households to plan for 
the future; to be able to make major 
investment, educational or lifestyle 
decisions with reasonable confidence that 
they will still be in a position to manage 
these in the years to come. An income loss 
may be unanticipated, and one that 
households are ill-prepared for. This may 
force them to cut back on consumption, 
deplete what savings they have or resort to 
borrowing. 
Furthermore, when households are 
faced with falls in their income, changes 
within the basket of goods and services 
consumed by households become very 
important. Though we are living through 
a period of low inflation, there has been a 
noticeable divergence in the relative costs 
of necessities and luxuries. Education, 
health, rental accommodation and 
homeownership costs1 have all increased 
at a faster rate than the Consumers Price 
Index (CPI) overall since 2006 (Deloitte 
and Victoria University of Wellington, 
2017). At the same time, the CPI has been 
held down by the falling price of imported 
manufactured goods, such as computing 
and cell phone technology. When incomes 
are rising faster than prices, this may not 
be a great concern. However, it does affect 
the balance of discretionary and non-
discretionary spending in the household 
budget, and therefore whether households 
need to respond to a shortfall in income 
by cutting back on something more 
fundamental than fine foods or holidays. 
Finally, income volatility measures 
provide us with an indirect look at the 
extent to which the welfare system is 
redistributing across the life cycle. As 
noted by Hills (2015), the variance of 
living standards at different stages of 
people’s lives was a core rationale for the 
creation of the welfare state. In 1899 
Seebohm Rowntree identified the ‘five 
alternating periods of want and 
comparative plenty’, based around the 
presence of children in the household and 
the individual commencing, and 
retirement from, their working life. In the 
model proposed by William Beveridge in 
1942, the effective transfer of resources 
over time could help to smooth out the 
periods of want by providing child 
allowances to those with additional 
mouths to feed and pensions to those in 
retirement. The same logic applied to 
misfortune which might intermittently 
threaten the livelihood of individuals and 
their families, principally periods of 
unemployment and ill health that impair 
one’s ability to work. 
In practice, there are areas where 
private insurance deals with risk relatively 
effectively, particularly regarding the 
protection of assets (e.g. home, car and 
contents). On the other hand, dealing 
with risk associated with future earnings 
seems to pose additional problems for 
markets. These problems include moral 
hazard, imperfect information and 
adverse selection. The fact that a private 
consumer is in fact generally not well 
informed about how long they will live, or 
their future chances of unemployment, 
means that risk in these areas has tended 
to be managed through direct state 
involvement, or at the very least a 
... income volatility measures provide 
us with an indirect look at the extent 
to which the welfare system is 
redistributing across the life cycle.
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considerable state role in regulating 
private markets (Barr, 2001). 
Measuring income volatility can give 
us a better idea of how the risk-sharing 
function of the welfare system is operating, 
in terms of providing assistance in times 
of need. But perhaps more importantly, it 
provides a measure of the extent to which 
economic loss is an inevitability for some 
part of the population at any given time. 
Social assistance, on this account, should 
be understood not so much as 
redistribution between static groups in 
society, but rather as redistribution across 
people’s own lives, from good times to bad 
(Hills, 2015, p.52). 
Data and methodology
To get an idea of the degree of volatility of 
New Zealanders’ incomes, we looked at the 
share of the working-age population who 
fell two or more income deciles from one 
year to the next between 2000 and 2014, 
based on Statistics New Zealand’s linked 
employer–employee data (LEED). By way 
of example, this would be someone in the 
top 10% of income earners one year whose 
income fell to somewhere in the bottom 
80% in the second year, or someone in 
the fifth decile (between the 40% and 
50% points of the income distribution) 
who fell into the bottom three deciles 
(the lowest 30%). This analysis is at the 
individual, rather than household, level. 
Table 1 shows how big an income loss 
a two-decile drop equates to. Taking the 
midpoints of each income decile,2 a two-
decile drop represents a loss of around 
40% of an individual’s income. Though 
this proportion varies somewhat, such a 
loss represents a substantial hit to 
household incomes. For obvious reasons, 
for those towards the lower end of the 
income distribution such a loss would 
have much greater repercussions in terms 
of meeting basic human needs. It should 
also be emphasised that this level of 
income loss is the minimum of what we 
are measuring. Some individuals will have 
fallen further than two deciles, and thus 
experienced an even more severe loss of 
income.  
The reason for confining the analysis 
to drops of at least two deciles is to remove 
some of the ‘noise’ that we might see by 
including those who have dropped one 
decile. This group might include people 
who were just above the bottom limit for 
an income threshold in one year, and have 
fallen into a lower bracket in the following 
year due to a small drop in income, or by 
being overtaken by increases in the bottom 
limit for their previous bracket. This has 
the effect of dampening the degree of 
measured volatility, but we would 
otherwise have no easy way of determining 
whether what we are measuring actually 
corresponds with a meaningful shock to 
individual incomes. 
This approach also means that we do 
not capture downward shifts in income 
for people in deciles 1 and 2, who do not 
have two deciles below them. For the sake 
of clarity, the exclusion of these deciles 
relates to the first year of the income 
transition measurement, meaning those 
falling from a decile to a lower one. The 
analysis does include individuals who fell 
into deciles 1 and 2 in the second year of 
the measurement (assuming that fall was 
of two deciles or more).  
Confining our analysis to New 
Zealanders between the ages of 20 and 64 
means that the picture is not complicated 
by people whose incomes fall due to 
retirement at age 65 or over, when they are 
entitled to New Zealand Superannuation. 
Individuals who were classified as ‘absent’ 
in the data set (i.e., not recording any 
income at all) for either the current year, 
or previous year, for any of the year-to-
year movements are not counted in this 
analysis. This therefore excludes people 
who have died, or left the country between 
one year and the next.
LEED includes data on New 
Zealanders’ income from wages, self-
employment and most government 
transfers, including income-tested 
benefits, student allowances, paid parental 
leave, New Zealand Superannuation and 
ACC. It does not include income from 
investments, government transfers that 
are not taxable (such as childcare 
payments, the accommodation 
supplement and disability allowances) or 
tax transfer payments by Inland Revenue 
or Work and Income New Zealand. This 
latter category includes the Working for 
Families tax credits, which are payments 
structured around the entitlement of 
families rather than individuals. As the 
data is based on tax information, we 
cannot account for undeclared income. 
The coverage of LEED beyond just 
market income means we are capturing 
not only the initial hit to an individual’s 
income, but also the effectiveness of the 
social welfare system in offsetting that 
loss. It is, however, notable that as LEED 
includes ACC payments, and the 
percentages of income that equate to a 
two-decile drop in Table 1 are all well over 
20%, ACC’s model of compensating for 
up to 80% of pre-injury income (up to a 
capped sum) should exclude all but the 
top decile from the share of New 
Zealanders suffering a two-decile fall.  
This picture may change slightly if we 
were able to account for all social transfers, 
including those detailed above not 
included in LEED. However, it is 
important to understand that some 
transfers are not designed as automatic 
stabilisers. Their effectiveness as a buffer 
against income loss is therefore 
questionable. For instance, a number of 
payments under the Working for Families 
tax credits have a paid work requirement 
of 20 hours per week for a single parent, 
Table 1: Absolute and proportional income impact of a two-income decile fall (2014 data)
Decile midpoint  two-decile loss percentage loss
1 [under $6,940]
2  $10,210 
3  $14,805 
4  $18,245  $8,035 44%
5  $23,395  $8,590 37%
6  $31,655  $13,410 42%
7  $42,050  $18,655 44%
8  $53,595  $21,940 41%
9  $70,160  $28,110 40%
10  [over $80,350] 
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or a combined 30 hours per week for 
couples. This means that falling below the 
required working hours would also effect 
a household’s entitlement to this 
assistance. In some circumstances the loss 
of entitlement to a work-related tax credit 
would be offset (partially or wholly) by an 
increased entitlement to the means-tested 
family tax credit. However, there may be 
situations in which a small decrease in the 
hours worked within a family leads to a 
change in Working for Families 
entitlement that actually amplifies the loss 
of household income, due to the steep 
‘cliff ’ associated with the strict work 
requirements of the in-work tax credit 
and minimum family tax credit. 
Findings
Figure 1 shows that close to one in 
nine working-age New Zealanders will 
suffer a significant fall in income in any 
given year. The volatility of incomes 
follows the business cycle, peaking 
in 2009 at approximately 12.5% and 
declining steadily thereafter. Despite this 
broad replication of overall economic 
conditions, it is notable that volatility was 
rising from 2005 onwards, prior to the 
onset of the global financial crisis. 
There has not been a trend of increased 
volatility over the period measured. The 
volatility of the most recent years 
measured is in fact lower than that of any 
year during the decade beginning in 2001. 
In terms of total numbers of individuals, 
the average number of New Zealanders 
seeing this degree of income loss between 
2001 and 2014 is over 214,000 each year.  
We are also able to examine where this 
aggregate level of volatility is concentrated 
in the income distribution. As Figure 2 
shows, deciles 4–6, or those receiving 
between $15,720 and $35,550 in 2014, 
have a notably higher level of volatility 
than the higher income deciles.3 For this 
group, the year-on-year risk of a 
substantial income drop is generally 
between 15% and 17%, or somewhere 
between a one-in-six and one-in-seven 
chance.
The volatility of incomes in this lower 
income group has also been slower to 
subside in the wake of the global financial 
crisis than that of the measured population 
as a whole. Figure 3 shows the difference 
in risk between the higher and lower 
income groups set out in Figure 2, and 
displays a clear trend towards an increasing 
gap between the two. The additional risk 
experienced by lower income groups has 
increased from somewhere below 5% 
from 2003 to 2009, to above 7% in the 
more recent years measured. This is due 
primarily to a falling level of risk among 
higher income groups, rather than risk at 
the lower end of the income distribution 
increasing in absolute terms. 
Income volatility by gender and age
The international literature tends to find 
that females have higher volatility of 
incomes than males (Dynan, Elmendorf 
and Sichel, 2012). The New Zealand 
data, seen in Figure 4, shows the same 
pattern. The volatility of female incomes 
is typically around one percentage point 
higher. Male incomes also seem to be 
more sensitive to the business cycle than 
female incomes. The volatility of male 
incomes rose more quickly with the onset 
of the global financial crisis (and is higher 
than for female incomes in 2010), and 
also subsided more quickly as economic 
conditions improved. 
This picture changes considerably 
when we look at the volatility of males and 
females in different income groups (Figure 
5). Dividing our eight-decile population 
into a lower income group (deciles 3–6) 
Figure 1: Proportion suffering a fall of two income deciles or more, individuals 
aged 20–64 years in deciles 3–10
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and a higher income group (deciles 7–10), 
we see that there is a significant divergence 
within the male population. While female 
income volatility is relatively similar 
between the higher and lower income 
groups (and both are higher than for the 
general population in Figure 1), the lower 
than average volatility of males overall 
obscures the fact that low-income males 
have very high volatility of income 
relatively speaking. It is the very stable 
incomes of high-income males that drags 
the aggregate level below that of females. 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of 
volatility by age. Over the period between 
2001 and 2014 financial risk was 
experienced in an uneven U-shape 
between young and old. The overall 
distribution shows much greater volatility 
of income for younger age groups. The 
rate does rise from age 50 onwards, as 
would be expected due to people choosing 
to retire, though redundancies and health-
related withdrawals from work can pose 
difficult challenges for people at this stage 
of their lives also. The volatility of incomes 
for those aged 65 and over is included 
here for comparison, and is considerably 
lower than that for any other age group. 
Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to 
this approach, which can be roughly 
grouped under two headings: those that 
likely overstate the degree of individual 
income volatility or its actual impact 
on households, and those that likely 
understate it. 
Factors overstating volatility (or its impact)
Dealing first of all with the former, there 
are some key qualifiers to treating this 
measure of income volatility as a direct 
proxy for economic risk or insecurity. 
The most obvious is that we cannot 
easily distinguish involuntary falls in 
income from voluntary ones. To give 
one example, consider a highly paid 
management consultant who decides 
to leave that position to instead teach 
a meditation class. This person would 
receive a much lower income (though 
would presumably be enriched in some 
other, non-monetary ways). In this 
analysis, such a person would be counted 
as suffering an income loss in the same 
way as someone who is made redundant 
and is unable to find work, yet naturally 
the concern we would show for the 
former situation is nothing like that we 
would show for the latter. The spiritually-
enriched former consultant does not lack 
for substantial freedoms, following Sen’s 
capabilities approach, in the same way as 
the out-of-work individual (Sen, 1999). 
The more common instances of 
voluntary income loss are likely to be 
those relating to work/life balance and 
changing careers. This includes those who 
reduce their involvement in paid work to 
undertake study or training, or to care for 
children, elderly parents or relatives with 
disabilities. However, all such decisions 
are made in circumstances that are beyond 
our own control to some degree, and there 
are clearly instances where such situations 
should not be understood as being fully 
voluntary. This includes someone 
choosing to retrain because they anticipate 
fewer job opportunities in their current 
industry, or those who have people close 
to them in need of their ongoing 
assistance. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note 
that an income loss which is regarded as 
voluntary might still be a matter of social 
concern. Retraining and parental leave are 
inevitable occurrences in society, and it is 
a matter of societal priorities as to whether 
more should be done to counterbalance 
the income loss that typically accompanies 
these situations. 
Figure 3: Difference in levels of volatility faced by higher and lower income groups 
in Figure 2 
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There are further factors to take into 
account that might overstate the impact 
of income volatility. As our data is 
individual, it does not take into account 
the picture at the household level, which is 
more important when it comes to the 
well-being of those who are part of a 
resource-sharing economic unit. 
Specifically, if a loss of income suffered by 
one individual leads to another income 
earner within the household increasing 
their work hours, then any impact on 
household consumption is likely to be 
offset to some degree. 
Unlike many international studies, 
this data is longitudinal only in a short-
term sense. We are observing in essence a 
large number of two-year snapshots over 
the 14 years of available data, and so 
cannot assess whether a fall in income 
from year one to year two is followed by a 
bounce back of some sort in year three. 
Furthermore, before making any 
judgements on whether an observed 
income loss leads to a decrease in 
household consumption, we ought to 
consider what options are available to 
households to ‘smooth’ deviations in 
income. For instance, households could 
(in some combination) resort to savings 
or draw upon other assets, borrow to 
cover a shortfall, or they may have access 
to insurance. This is discussed in greater 
detail below. 
Factors understating volatility
Although we do not see a clear secular 
trend in income volatility over the period 
of 2001 to 2014, both the level of volatility 
and its concentration among income 
groups and between genders presents an 
interesting picture. There are a number of 
limitations to this analysis which might 
understate the level of income volatility 
among New Zealanders.
Focusing on downward movement 
between income deciles, and excluding 
shifts of only one decile, means that this 
analysis excludes deciles 1 and 2. This 
approach means that we do not capture 
falls in income experienced by the bottom 
20% of income earners, who do not have 
two income deciles below them, but for 
whom any significant decrease in income 
would be a considerable shock. The 
overall volatility of incomes in New 
Zealand is also understated by not 
including absolute decreases in income 
that do not result in someone changing 
income brackets. For instance, someone at 
the top end of decile 5 could suffer a fall in 
income of $5,000, but still remain in the 
same decile bracket.
It should also be noted that this 
analysis, along with most international 
studies, is focused on inter-year volatility. 
A growing international literature is 
focused on intra-year volatility, most 
typically through measuring variances in 
month-to-month incomes (Bania and 
Leete, 2009; Hills, 2015). This is often 
closely associated with the ‘gig economy’, 
which involves non-traditional 
employment around short-term tasks, 
projects or relationships with clients, and 
often utilises online platforms (Bughin 
and Mischke, 2016).
Month-to-month volatility poses a 
different set of challenges to a substantial 
shock to income from one year to the 
next, which might be associated with a 
period of unemployment or serious 
illness. A single major shock might be 
smoothed out through drawing upon 
savings for those fortunate enough to 
have them (for a transitory shock), or 
require a challenging but manageable 
adjustment in lifestyle (for a permanent 
shock). However, month-to-month 
variations in income require a constant 
process of budgeting, exhausting and 
restoring financial buffers and the greater 
Figure 5: Comparisons of male and female volaility by income groups, deciles 
3–6 and 7–10, aged 20–64 years
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likelihood of an ongoing reliance on debt, 
possibly at high interest rates. Informal 
assistance from friends and family 
members is another source of buffers for 
unstable short-term incomes, though not 
everyone has this option available. 
Furthermore, an individual living off 
an income that is both low and variable is 
likely to face an ever-shifting entitlement 
to social assistance. This is important, first 
of all, because some entitlements require 
that workers are in a job for a certain 
period of time before they are available 
(i.e. sick leave, parental leave). Having an 
adequate knowledge of one’s entitlement 
to assistance, and the time and complexity 
associated with claiming it, can also pose 
considerable barriers for some people. In 
September 2017, TV3’s The Nation 
reported that, according an Official 
Information Act request, difficulties 
around claiming benefits meant that 
approximately $200 million each year was 
not received by families who were entitled 
to receive it.4 
Discussion
There are two main areas arising out of 
this analysis that this article shall address. 
The first is to explore the position of 
income volatility in relation to the more 
well-established work on income mobility. 
The second is to put these findings in a 
broader context of economic and social 
trends, and offer some tentative answers as 
to why income volatility in New Zealand 
looks the way it does. 
Income mobility – the relative or 
absolute movements in an individual’s 
income over time – has become a topic of 
considerable academic interest in recent 
years. This has been parallel to work on 
income and wealth inequality, and 
connected to it in a number of ways. The 
rising or increased levels of income 
inequality in many advanced economies 
over recent decades has led to concerns 
about intergenerational mobility: that is, 
whether the concentration of rewards at 
the top of the income distribution is 
leading to the development of more rigid 
social classes, where one’s chances in life 
are more closely tied to the socio-
economic position of one’s parents. In 
this context, income mobility is often seen 
as an indicator of equality of opportunity, 
though this is less true of (short-term) 
measures of intra-generational mobility 
than longer-term intergenerational 
studies (Corak, 2013). 
At the same time, income mobility is 
seen as offering a more nuanced 
understanding of the distribution of 
income in society than a static picture of 
the shares that different groups receive at 
a certain point in time. To put it another 
way, the level of income inequality over 
one’s lifetime is likely to be less than at a 
single point in time. The argument here is 
that the implications of a less equal 
distribution of income might be different 
depending on the degree to which there is 
movement between income groups over 
time (Barker, 1996). For instance, a New 
Zealand Treasury paper notes that ‘There 
is change in incomes between one year 
and the next, with over 60 percent of the 
population changing income decile group 
... Only 22 percent stay in the same income 
decile group eight years later’ (Carter, 
Mok and Le, 2014).
In some sense, income volatility 
presents the flip side of this story. At the 
superficial level of mental images, the 
level of income volatility discussed here 
may naturally evoke a picture of loss and 
misfortune. Yet it is important to bear in 
mind that upward relative movements 
between income deciles is the necessary 
corollary of downward shifts. In a similar 
sense, the work presented here on income 
volatility demonstrates that what is often 
presented as a positive story of income 
mobility also includes a significant level of 
downward shifts in income in absolute 
terms, not simply relative shifts. 
This underscores an important point: 
a society marked by highly unstable 
incomes is likely to appear as a reasonably 
mobile society over the shorter run; 
however, over the longer run it is plausible 
that a society that does not deal with 
individual risk in an effective way will see 
initial disparities in life chances reinforced. 
As John Hills has detailed, the advantages 
of being born to affluent parents are not 
limited to the early years of life, but are 
reinforced throughout the life cycle, in the 
form of assistance with higher education, 
help with housing costs or the deposit for 
a house purchase, inheritance and other 
intra-family transfers of wealth (Hills, 
2015). All things being equal, these 
advantages are likely to mean that their 
beneficiaries will deal with economic risk 
much better than those without such 
advantages – a proposition which is 
consistent with the higher concentration 
of income volatility among the lower-
middle class. 
As noted, downward shifts between 
income deciles must by necessity coincide 
with upward shifts by others in society. 
This raises the issue of the extent to which 
we can weigh these prospects against one 
another. It could be argued that individuals 
are to some degree compensated for the 
greater risk of downward shifts by the 
corresponding chance of upward 
movement.5 For instance, Carter, Mok 
and Le (2014) found that in 2002 New 
Zealanders had an equal chance (6%) of 
their income increasing or decreasing by 
$20,000 or more in the following year. 
It makes sense to take this offsetting 
upward mobility into account; however, 
there is good reason to view the risk of 
downward movements as a serious 
concern, notwithstanding any 
corresponding chance of upward 
movements in the same year. The first is 
people’s tendency to experience loss 
... income mobility is seen as offering 
a more nuanced understanding of the 
distribution of income in society than a 
static picture of the shares that different 
groups receive at a certain point in time. 
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aversion, meaning that people tend to 
value avoiding a fall in their position more 
than they value an equivalent increase 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). If we 
consider subjective well-being to be an 
objective of public policy, then this would 
tend to favour a lower volatility system. 
The second reason is that it is 
unquestionably a lot easier to adjust 
household finances to an increase in 
income than a decrease. Many of our 
outgoings represent long-term, fixed 
commitments (for instance, mortgages 
and rental accommodation, education-
related expenses, childcare), and having to 
unravel these obligations can be difficult, 
costly or disruptive to social networks and 
established relationships. We should also 
bear in mind the social and psychological 
costs that might be suffered in the course 
of this transition, if the end result is that a 
household experiences a greater degree of 
material deprivation.  
Social and economic context
It may be surprising to some that New 
Zealand does not exhibit the same 
observable increase in income volatility 
that has generally been found in other 
advanced countries. However, a number 
of points should be borne in mind. First, 
many of these (particularly US) studies 
find an increase in volatility that predates 
the scope of this analysis. A number of 
more recent studies have found a relatively 
stable trend over the period since 2000 
(Hardy and Ziliak, 2014). 
Second, labour market changes are 
often highlighted as a causal factor in 
trends in income volatility, and though 
New Zealand has undergone some 
significant transformations on this front, 
these also predate the years covered by 
LEED. One third of New Zealanders are in 
non-standard employment. However, the 
growth in part-time work largely took 
place in the late 1980s and 1990s, and the 
share of self-employed people has been 
relatively stable (Statistics New Zealand, 
2014).
Third, it is possible that there are 
different trends for various components 
of incomes, as found by Jenkins (2011) 
with regard to data for the United 
Kingdom. Such divergences may act to 
offset one another, and disguise any 
underlying trend. Further work on 
disaggregating the components of income 
would provide greater insight on this 
point. However, it should be noted that 
the major welfare change in this era, the 
Working for Families tax package, is not 
captured by the data used here.6 
This analysis provides an ex post view 
of disruptions to individual incomes. 
While we are not in a position to directly 
assess how effectively households can 
smooth volatility in individual incomes, 
some tentative comments can be made 
regarding what is known about options 
for offsetting income loss. 
 Rashbrooke, Rashbrooke and Molano 
(2017) provide evidence from as recently 
as 2010 on the wealth held by New Zealand 
households. Table 2 compares these 
findings with the midpoint income losses 
represented by a two-income decile fall 
(as set out in Table 1). Mean net worth is 
greater than the (minimum) income loss 
measured in this analysis for each decile, 
though this wealth is typically 
concentrated in housing equity. The two 
right-hand columns show the mean worth 
of more liquid assets: cash in the bank and 
financial assets. For deciles 4–7, the 
income loss is greater than the mean total 
of liquid assets. For decile 8, it is broadly 
equal. 
Households are, of course, likely to 
smooth income losses through some 
combination of budgeting, drawing upon 
assets and borrowing. However, this 
comparison provides some context for the 
extent of the income loss that is measured 
in this study of income volatility, relative 
to the financial buffers that New Zealand 
households have available to them. The 
figures for wealth are at a household level, 
whereas the income volatility data is for 
individuals. 
Partnering and forming a household 
provides an additional avenue of risk 
sharing (though obviously that is far from 
the only reason for doing so). The share of 
couples with dependent children who are 
both employed (as opposed to one or 
neither being employed) has actually risen 
steadily in recent decades. This rate was 
below 60% in 2000, and had reached the 
mid-60s by 2014 (though there has been 
an even larger increase in the years since 
2014, to close to 70%; Statistics New 
Zealand, n.d.). This means that more 
households have more than one source of 
labour market income; however, it may 
also represent an increasing share of 
households that need two incomes to get 
by. 
Conclusions and further research
This analysis has provided an indirect and 
tentative look at the incidence of income-
related shocks, and the effectiveness of 
the institutional system in effectively 
dealing with this risk. The level, trend 
and concentration of income loss present 
an uneven picture. It does not appear 
that the aggregate level of volatility has 
increased since 2001. However, lower 
income groups face much greater chances 
of a substantial fall in income than higher 
income groups, but are likely to have fewer 
financial buffers and less resilience against 
economic loss. We also see very different 
Table 2: Comparison of loss associated with a two-decile drop vs wealth position by decile
Decile Two-decile loss Mean net worth ($) Mean financial 
assets ($)
Mean cash in 
bank ($)
1 -$23,000  $400  $1,200 
2  $3,200  $100  $700 
3  $12,300  $200  $2,000 
4  $8,035  $32,000  $600  $3,100 
5  $8,590  $68,700  $1,600  $6,100 
6  $13,410  $124,800  $2,700  $7,900 
7  $18,655  $193,600  $3,600  $10,700 
8  $21,940  $280,600  $6,400  $15,800 
9  $28,110  $428,300  $14,400  $25,200 
10  $1,289,700  $63,500  $69,100 
Wealth data for 2010 from Rashbrooke, Rashbrooke and Molano, 2017 (data tables provided by authors).
Note: calculation of decile midpoints is based on 2014 data.    
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levels of risk between age groups and 
between genders, as well as within genders 
once income is taken into account. 
There are a good number of areas 
where further research might add to our 
understanding of income volatility in New 
Zealand. Assessing the incidence of 
economic loss over a longer time period 
would give a better idea of how policy 
changes have affected the level of financial 
risk faced by New Zealanders. Matching up 
this work with a better understanding of 
how and when households can smooth 
their consumption in the face of income 
loss (and how this varies between different 
groups) would provide a much better 
indicator of how this aggregate level of 
volatility translates to outcomes for 
individuals and families. This includes 
intra-family transfers, and the implications 
of this for intergenerational mobility. And, 
as noted above, the volatility of inter-year 
incomes does not give us a good idea of 
how incomes are fluctuating over a shorter 
time frame, such as the measures of 
monthly volatility that are emerging 
internationally. The impact of changing 
work patterns and automation on the 
stability of household incomes is likely to 
be a major concern for the future.
Finally, although it is difficult to say 
what level of volatility ought to be 
considered acceptable within society, 
there are certainly patterns in the 
distribution of financial risk that should 
be cause for concern. Further work on 
how policy changes can provide greater 
economic security to households is 
therefore important. Individuals and 
households have diverse aspirations, and 
different things about their lives that they 
each hold dear. However, we all have a 
common interest in making sure that the 
inevitable incidence of misfortune within 
society does not unduly determine the 
course of our lives. 
1 Homeownership in the CPI does not include the price of 
land. It therefore understates the price of homeownership. 
2 All figures referring to decile bands are before tax, and refer 
to 2014 figures. 
3 Decile 3, the lowest decile measured through this approach, 
has conversely very low volatility relative to other lower 
deciles. It is unclear how much of this is a limitation of the 
methodology at the bottom end of the income spectrum. 
For instance, an individual in decile 3 faces the possibility 
of falling up to two deciles at most, compared to someone 
in the fifth decile who can fall up to four deciles, and so on. 
The proportional drop for decile 3 falling to decile 1 would 
also be much greater than the equivalent fall for higher 
deciles. 
4 http://www.newshub.co.nz/home/election/2017/09/winz-
creating-two-classes-of-kiwis-labour.html; http://www.
radionz.co.nz/news/election-2017/339064/winz-staff-
accused-of-withholding-entitlements. 
5 Thanks to Norman Gemmell for this point. 
6 Such changes may have had a dynamic effect on other 
components of individual income, but the evidence on 
this suggests that this package had a positive impact on 
employment (Dalgety et al., 2010). Such changes would 
most likely be related to labour market income, and therefore 
visible in the data. 
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